Rev Int Organ (2017) 12:613–641
DOI 10.1007/s11558-016-9253-0

Which type of international organizations can settle civil wars?

Magnus Lundgren[1]

Published online: 30 June 2016

Abstract International organizations (IOs) take on an increasing share of civil war mediation around the world. The determinants of IO mediation effectiveness remain poorly understood, partly because prior research has not adequately captured the institutional heterogeneity of peace-brokering IOs. To explore how mediation effectiveness depends on institutional variation, I combine newly gathered data on the design of 13 peace-brokering IOs with existing data on 109 civil war mediation episodes in the 1975-2004 period. I find that IOs with institutionalized capabilities to deploy field missions, such as peacekeeping operations, outperform other IOs as mediators of civil wars, whereas information-gathering capacity does not yield a significant advantage. The results suggest that IO enforcement assistance has a forward-looking effect: the ability to credibly signal, ex ante, that peacekeeping or monitoring forces will be deployed to enforce an agreement, helps IOs shape negotiations long before forces are actually deployed. Reaffirming the credible commitment theory of conflict resolution, the study demonstrates that there is considerable variation among external guarantors, which explains why some IOs can shift civil war disputants away from violent bargaining strategies whereas other cannot.

Keywords International organizations · Institutional design · Mediation · Civil war · Conflict resolution

JEL Classification F53 · D7

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s11558-016-9253-0) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

✉ Magnus Lundgren
magnus.lundgren@statsvet.su.se

[1] Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden

1 Introduction

Third party mediation, or external diplomatic interventions to promote the peaceful resolution of military hostilities, has become increasingly frequent in recent decades. While states remain the key mediators, international organizations (IOs) have become more active, more diverse, and better equipped, leading them to adopt a more prominent role in contemporary conflict resolution, particularly in civil war contexts. Compared with the 1980s, when some 4 percent of civil war years experienced IO mediation, the ratio in the 2000s was nearly four times as high (DeRouen et al. 2011). There is also an increased diversity in the supply of IO mediators. Regional and sub-regional organizations have become more ambitious, aspiring to provide conflict management functions similar to those of the UN. The attempt by the Arab League to broker a ceasefire in Syria, the African Union's role as a go-between during the 2011 Libyan civil war, ASEAN's mediation in the Cambodia-Thai border dispute, peacekeeping by ECOWAS in Liberia, and OAS's efforts to support the peace process in Colombia all provide illustrations of this trend. In parallel with this increased activity, international organizations have become better equipped, progressively expanding their repertoire of conflict management instruments. For example, the UN Department of Political Affairs, the unit handling most of the UN's mediation efforts, has seen its budget rise six-fold in the last fifteen years, including the financing of a Mediation Support Unit and regional centers for analysis and preventive diplomacy. Other IOs are following suit. The African Union established a Peace and Security Council in 2004, as one of its many institutional features related to conflict management, and even ASEAN, typically oriented towards non-interference, is displaying an emergent interest in mediation and preventive diplomacy.

These trend lines – a more frequent resort to mediation, a wider range of IO mediators, and a continuing proliferation of capacities – trigger questions about effectiveness: does this institutional mobilization make a difference and, if so, how? Existent large-n literature on civil war mediation has been constrained by a lack of good institutional data, compelling scholars to model IOs as uniform and temporally static entities (e.g., Gartner 2011), with the consequence that convincing accounts of how variation in institutional capabilities matter for outcomes has yet to emerge. While we know that IO design matters (Koremenos et al. 2001) and that it impacts *interstate* peace-making (Boehmer et al. 2004; Haftel 2007), we know little about its impact on IO peacemaking in the *intrastate* domain.

This article sets out to explore the relative efficacy of IOs in the resolution of civil wars, with a focus on the relationship between institutional design and mediation effectiveness. Drawing on bargaining theory, it develops two theoretical mechanisms for how variation in IO design shapes the ability to ameliorate conflict drivers: (1) IOs with greater institutionalized informational capacities can source more and better information, helping them alleviate information asymmetries; and (2) IOs with greater institutionalized field mission capacities are more able to provide guarantees, helping them alleviate commitment problems.

To evaluate these mechanisms, I gathered new panel data on the institutional evolution of 13 peace-brokering IOs in the post-World War II era. These data are a significant improvement over existing data on IO capabilities (e.g., Boehmer et al. 2004), as they allow for an analysis that is sensitive not only to institutional variation across IOs, but also across time, thereby opening up for the measurement of precise institutional effects. Combining my data on IO design with data on 109 cases of IO civil war mediation between 1975 and 2004, I find empirical support for the proposition that mediation effectiveness is conditioned on institutional capabilities. Most importantly, for both procedural and substantive measures of mediation effectiveness, a higher field mission capacity is associated with a greater likelihood of positive outcomes. According to my data, moving from the lowest level of field mission capability to the highest level raises the predicted probability of reaching a negotiated settlement by up to 30 percentage points. This finding underlines the central role played by post-settlement guarantees in the resolution of civil wars (Walter 2002; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008) and, more importantly, indicates that the relationship extends into pre-settlement mediation contexts. That is, external guarantees in the form of peacekeeping or monitoring forces may affect peace negotiations even *before* a settlement is agreed upon and even *before* a force is deployed. Furthermore, not all IO guarantees are the same; IOs with highly developed field mission capabilities at central secretariats are much more likely to convince disputants to shift away from violent bargaining strategies.

Contrary to prior studies (Savun 2008), I do not find that IOs with highly institutionalized informational capacities are more effective than other IOs. While this does not disqualify information-provision as a causal mechanism, it may suggest that relevant information is sourced from face-to-face mediation interactions rather than via bureaucratic bodies. This finding is also consistent with the proposition that warfare itself functions to correct information asymmetries (Fearon 1995) and that, as a conflict progresses, commitment problems gradually overtake information asymmetries as the main barrier to efficient bargaining.

There is also evidence of selection effects. Using a Heckman selection model to analyze which of 1,170 civil war years in the observed period were selected by IOs for mediation, I find that IOs tend to select slightly more challenging cases, a result that corresponds to prior findings for IO mediation (Gartner 2011) and peacekeeping (Fortna 2008). Overall, the results are robust to selection biases. However, in the absence of fully convincing instrumental variables to support an exclusion restriction (Angrist et al. 1996), the scope of firm generalization is limited to civil wars that typically receive IO mediation.

Overall, the study represents the first attempt to gauge the impact of institutional design on the outcomes of IO mediation in the domain of civil war. The results confirm the utility of wedding the literature on IO institutional design to the literature on conflict resolution, suggesting that studies that overlook institutional variation run the risk of introducing significant measurement bias.

2 Mediating intra-state bargaining failure: The role of institutional capabilities

2.1 State of the art

Despite its popularity as a tool for conflict resolution, mediation remains a blunt instrument, failing more often than it succeeds (Wallensteen and Svensson 2014; Greig and Diehl 2012; Regan et al. 2009) and frequently resulting in settlements that lack self-enforcing qualities (Beardsley 2011). However, prior research has identified some correlates of mediation success, including conflict characteristics, such as intensity of violence (Bercovitch and Diehl 1997), and attributes of the mediation intervention itself, such as overall strategy (Dixon 1996) or timing (Regan and Stam 2000; Zartman 2000). Other studies have looked at the characteristics of the mediator, examining variation in effectiveness across mediators' relationships to conflict parties (Princen 1992) and how it affects the ability to ameliorate information asymmetries and problems of credible commitment (Kydd 2003; Crescenzi et al. 2011; Rauchhaus 2006; Lundgren and Svensson 2014). These studies have provided important insights, but several questions remain.

With regard to mediation by international organizations, specifically, there are three key limitations to our understanding. First, with a few exceptions (Haftel 2007; 2012; Boehmer et al. 2004; Hansen et al. 2008), prior research has often overlooked how varied IOs are in terms of mandate, institutional design, and resources, compelled by inadequate data sources to adopt a perspective of IOs as organizational monoliths fixed in time. Viewing IOs as temporally static, homogeneous actors exposes the scholar to the risk of missing how evolving structures and resources impact their effectiveness. Only by taking institutional heterogeneity into account, across time and across organizations, can we begin to understand why IOs are sometimes effective and sometimes not.[1]

Second, we know relatively little about how specific IO features link up to the causal mechanisms thought to be involved in the onset and termination of intrastate armed conflict. For example, while many studies assume that an external mediator can promote peace by providing information to disputants, there are few studies that clearly specify how an IO mediator (or any other third party) goes about sourcing this information.[2] Similarly, it has been convincingly demonstrated (Walter 2002) that IOs may promote peace by providing compliance guarantees, but we still do not know which type of IOs can fulfill this function, and which aspects of IO design enhance the credibility of such guarantees. Greater attention to the various components of the "tool box" available to IO mediators can help clarify these theoretical linkages.

[1] See Hafner-Burton et al. (2008) for a more extensive argument for moving beyond IO homogeneity assumptions.

[2] In the most comprehensive review of the bargaining literature on conflict resolution to date, Kydd (2010, p. 101) states: "Providing information via mediation is seen as effective in preventing conflict, but questions remain about precisely how it works. . . [the literature] leaves unmodeled how the mediator acquires the information he shares with one of the participants."

Third, with a few exceptions (e.g., Gartner 2011), large-N studies of IO mediation (including Boehmer et al. 2004; Hansen et al. 2008) have focused on interstate conflict, leaving questions of IO mediation of intrastate conflict unexplored, despite the fact that civil wars are – by far – the most common form of military conflict today (Themnér and Wallensteen 2013). Simultaneously, the literature on civil war (see Blattman and Miguel 2010 for an overview) has tended to emphasize domestic factors over international ones.[3] Recognizing the analytical divide, both quantitative and qualitative scholars are making efforts to re-emphasize the international dimension of civil war (Cederman et al. 2013; Checkel 2013). As it provides a way to combine domestic and international levels of analysis, the study of IO civil war mediation from an institutionalist perspective is one component of this research agenda.

2.2 Conflict bargaining and mediation

Rationalist bargaining theory conventionally models the onset of war as the failure of two actors, with opposing preferences over the division of a resource, to reach a negotiated solution (Fearon 1995; Powell 2002). Why would rational actors engage in war, which is both risky and costly, rather than reaching the same outcome – or a better one – through peaceful negotiations? Two basic mechanisms are at the center of the rationalist explanation: asymmetric information and commitment problems.[4]

In the first mechanism, bargaining breakdown results from the actors' divergent beliefs as to the parameters determining the range of feasible bargains, in particular military capacity and resolve (Blainey 1988; Fearon 1995; Powell 2002). Under conditions of complete information, the actors know the extent of the bargaining range and can therefore successfully avoid triggering war. Under conditions of asymmetric information, however, the actors may have divergent estimates of the bargaining range, leading them to make offers or demands that increase the risk of armed conflict. Such information asymmetries stem from the existence of incentives to misrepresent one's strength to gain an edge over opponents, and, in a behavioral perspective, from limitations on an actor's capacity to receive and process information.

In the second mechanism, bargaining failure is explained through commitment problems (Fearon 1995; Powell 1996, 2006; Wagner 2007), which arise if actors cannot generate solid expectations that they will respect an agreement into the future. Such mistrust may originate in the expectation of future power shifts, fears of revenge and retribution after demobilization, or from situations where politics and history have reinforced beliefs about the malign intentions of the counterpart. In civil wars, commitment problems are often particularly acute in the transitionary stage between conflict and post-conflict, as former combatants face the challenge of implementing power-sharing deals while mistrust is still ripe (Walter 2002).

[3] Kalyvas and Balcells (2010, p.415) emphasize: "incorporating the international system into the analysis of civil wars is critical for understanding the evolution and transformation of internal conflict."

[4] See Anderton et al. (2010) for a discussion of alternative mechanisms, including issue indivisibility, political bias, and malevolence.

If we believe that violent conflict can result from scarcity of accurate information, or from the inability of actors to make credible commitments, we may argue that peace is more likely when actors hold a greater volume of relevant information and when commitments are credible. Any third party seeking to promote peace must then seek to facilitate these conditions, either through the provision of information or through guaranteeing commitments. This general insight, offered in previous theoretical work on mediation (Gilady and Russett 2002; Kydd 2003; Rauchhaus 2006; Svensson 2007), is here combined with insights from the literature on institutional design (Koremenos et al. 2001; Haftel 2007) to develop two accounts of the role of institutional capabilities in IO mediation.

2.3 The role of institutional capabilities in IO civil war mediation

I conceptualize IOs as actors composed of international bureaucracies and member states (Koremenos et al. 2001), but the analytical emphasis lies on bureaucratic capabilities. In this framework, an IO faced with the task of mediating a civil war can make two types of interventions, corresponding to the two mechanisms above. The first intervention type is information-provision, which seeks to converge the disputants' bargaining expectations enough to make a proposal mutually acceptable. Such information-provision may be direct, in which the IO shares an external view of the bargaining range (most often in the form of draft agreements), or indirect, in which the IO functions as a channel for information exchange between the disputants.

Previous scholarship (Savun 2008; Lindley 2007; Sisk 2009) and policy-oriented literature (e.g., Thruelsen 2009) suggest that certain bureaucratic capabilities play an important role in the execution of these tasks, in particular institutional bodies that can support mediation interventions with coordination, intelligence-gathering, and political analysis. An IO mediator with greater institutional capability can gather not only more, but also more specific and relevant, information. We may think of it as not only increasing the volume of information, but also reducing the risk of misinterpretation, or, if we follow standard formal models of mediation (e.g., Kydd 2003), as reducing the size of the error term, ϵ, in the sourcing of information. A less resourced mediator will make information assessments with a high variance, or high error term, leading to predictions that are less certain, and are thus less certain to lead the receiver to change his perceptions. A more resourced mediator will make assessments with a lower variance, and therefore will be more likely to be useful to the receiver, ceteris paribus. Having better institutionalized information sources may also help an IO mediator to contextualize the combatants' bargaining positions, for example, by identifying deals and proposals that may satisfy a rebel leader's constituency, or by detecting when a conflict is "ripe" for mediation (Zartman 2000). Furthermore, a deeper contextual understanding could help a third party understand informational facets of commitment problems, an advantage when seeking to optimize the viability of post-conflict institutional arrangements, such as power-sharing deals that may be under consideration during a mediation process (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005; Mattes and Savun 2009).

Hypothesis 1 *IOs with institutionalized capabilities for the gathering, processing, and dissemination of conflict-specific information are more likely to mediate effectively than IOs lacking such capabilities.*

The second type of mediation intervention is the provision of forward-looking guarantees, whereby an IO offers, ex ante, to assist in the enforcement of agreements under consideration, for example through the future deployment of a peacekeeping or monitoring force (Walter 1997, 2002, 2009; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008).[5] If such an offer is credible, it may shift the combatants' expectations as to the enforceability of an agreement, making them more prone to accept it. The credibility of an offer of forward-looking guarantees is likely to be a function of the combatants' expectations as to the likelihood of an offer actually materializing, and subsequently, of how much resources and experience an IO can mobilize for its support.

Qualitative evidence suggest that IOs often present future guarantees during peacemaking interventions. For example, the first phase of the civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997) attracted several attempts at mediation by states and IOs, all of which proved unsuccessful. Only following UN mediation that combined regional diplomacy with promises of post-agreement assistance, did the Tajik government and its main opponent, UTO, agree to a cease-fire. To facilitate compliance, the UN established UNMOT, a small observer mission, which sought to provide information on cease-fire violations as a way to reduce uncertainties and enable tit-for-tat de-escalation. However, this field mission was under-resourced and the cease-fire in Tajikistan gradually fell apart. It was not until stronger guarantees were extended during renewed mediation efforts in 1996 and 1997 that the conflict was brought to a durable settlement (Iji 2005).

The Tajik case illustrates the general importance of robust IO guarantees, but also that the nature of guarantees matters. This point is further illustrated in interventions by ECOWAS in the civil war in Liberia, where temporal variation in IO capabilities is a likely explanation for the variation in outcomes. Mediation attempts by ECOWAS in the early 1990s did not lead to a durable solution, mainly because the IO lacked the adequate field mission capabilities. As argued by Ero (1995), the Liberian interventions were undertaken "without the necessary equipment or mandate in place." However, when ECOWAS again sought to mediate in Liberia in 2003, its field mission capabilities had expanded considerably, paving the way for a more effective outcome. The offer of enforcement guarantees in the form of a field mission then helped ensure that this settlement was not only reached, but that it proved more durable than its predecessor. Since ECOWAS underwent significant evolution with regard to institutional design and capabilities during this time, a comparison between

[5]One might argue that guarantees, being formal reassurances that certain conditions relating to an agreement will be fulfilled in the future, are always "forward-looking" in one way or another. I use "forward-looking" to emphasize the fact that these guarantees are used instrumentally, *before* combatants agree, to increase the likelihood that they will do so, and *before* any deployment is actually made.

the first and second phases of ECOWAS interventions provides an illustration of how variation in field mission capability may determine the outcome of IO civil war mediation. It is not only a matter of guarantees, but of the nature of the guarantor.

Accordingly, based on theoretical reasoning and case evidence, I arrive at the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2 *IOs with institutionalized capabilities for the deployment of field missions are more likely to mediate effectively than IOs lacking such capabilities.*

The two hypotheses are complementary rather than conflicting. The expectation is that both would shape IO effectiveness, but at different points in the conflict cycle and with different magnitude. Given the ability of disputants to "look down the road" and judge the likelihood of agreement implementation (Walter 2002), it is expected that field mission capabilities are the relatively more important factor. The observable implications are straight-forward. If the theory of information provision is correct, as per Hypothesis 1 we would expect to observe that mediation by IOs endowed with greater informational capabilities in central secretariats outperform other IOs in cases with comparable baseline expectations. Similarly, if the theory of guarantees is correct, as per Hypothesis 2 we would expect to observe that mediation by IOs endowed with greater field mission capabilities outperform other IOs, especially in terms of substantive outcomes.

3 Data

For data on IO mediation episodes, I selected all observations of IO mediation from the two primary existing data sources on civil war interventions, the Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War (DICW) dataset (Regan et al. 2009) and the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset (DeRouen et al. 2011).[6] I merged these observations into one new data structure. Since DICW and CWM rely on very similar data collection procedures and coding schemes, using identical definitions of mediation and mediation outcomes (Bercovitch 1997), the risks of merging observations from two datasets are outweighed by the advantages: a greater number of observations, a smaller risk of sampling bias, and stronger validity in the coding of observations that overlap between the two datasets.

For observations where the DICW or CWM listed several mediators, I coded those based on the "lead" actor, excluding cases where international organizations mediated as junior partners with a state. In those few cases where DICW and CWM had assigned different outcome categories to the same mediation episode, I assigned the most conservative estimate or, if the difference was two categories, the median

[6]Table 1.1 in the online appendix provides an overview of the variables, coding, and sources.

category. Eight missing values for mediation outcome were filled in by researching appropriate historical sources.

Each observation of IO mediation was then matched to data on the corresponding civil war dyad, drawn from the UCDP-PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2013). Since both DICW and CWM list mediation episodes with extreme variation as to duration and frequency, introducing a risk of validity problems, I standardized the observations by grouping mediation episodes on a yearly basis. The final data contained 109 cases of IO mediation in the 1975 to 2004 period. Of these, 43 were drawn from DICW, 21 from CWM, and 50 were overlapping between the two datasets, a distribution that suggests that DICW and CWM suffer from sampling biases and that a merger was methodologically beneficial.

3.1 Mediation effectiveness

The empirical evaluation of mediation outcomes is complicated by several factors.[7] First, durable outcomes can be gauged only in hindsight, sometimes only after considerable time. The longer the time between intervention and the point in time where outcomes are evaluated, the greater the risk of introducing confounding. Second, what we see is not necessarily what we get: combatants may engage in peace negotiations for strategic reasons – to buy time, build a reputation, or maintain a relationship to an external power – without a sincere willingness to reach a lasting settlement (Beardsley 2011; Princen 1992; Richmond 1998). Third, there is considerable theoretical disagreement about precisely what factors need to change, and by how much, in order for a mediation intervention to be regarded as successful. A minimalist definition would emphasize the termination of conflict, as in "negative peace," a limited conception defined by the absence of military violence. A maximalist definition would emphasize the resolution of conflict in more encompassing terms, as in "positive peace," defined not only by the absence of violence, but by the existence of just, and therefore sustainably peaceful, conditions (cf. Galtung 1969).

Given the inherent difficulties of operationalizing a maximalist definition, most researchers have tended towards the minimalist range of the spectrum, using negotiated settlements or agreements as criteria, as in Rauchhaus (2006) ("peaceful settlement"), Savun (2008)("ceasefire, partial or full settlement"), and Elgström et al. (2003) ("ceasefire or settlement").

While procedural definitions of mediation success do not allow us to say whether mediation promotes durable peace (see Beardsley (2011) for an extended argument), a negotiated settlement implies a reduction of violence, greater humanitarian access, and often functions as a precursor to a more comprehensive resolution

[7]For a discussion of the complexities involved when evaluating mediation, see Kleiboer (1996) and Greig and Diehl (2012).



Fig. 1 Overview of the dependent variables. Three different variables (in shaded boxes) are used to capture procedural and substantive measures of mediation effectiveness across the conflict cycle

of a conflict (Greig and Diehl 2012; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Sisk 2009). This is illustrated by the fact that many of the most troublesome civil wars in recent decades (for example El Salvador, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Guatemala, Liberia, Philippines) were brought to an end through negotiated settlements.

In recognition of the above-mentioned conceptual difficulties, and to separate out variation in causal effects, this study estimates mediation effectiveness using both substantive and procedural outcomes, as illustrated in Fig. 1. A mediation episode was coded as resulting in a *settlement* if mediation ended in a peace agreement, negotiated between the main disputants, independently of whether the conflict was terminated or not. A mediation episode was coded as leading to *effective settlement* if mediation produced a settlement and the conflict was terminated, that is, the country did not experience armed conflict (between the same parties) in the year following the mediation episode, as determined from the UCDP-PRIO data. A mediation episode was coded as a *durable settlement* if there was a settlement and no war between same parties five years after the mediation episode. By combining procedural and substantive measures in this way, I could exclude most cases where war termination resulted from non-mediation causes, thereby accounting for an important source of bias. It also allows for the analysis of outcomes across different phases of the mediation cycle, from negotiation to agreement and implementation. With these criteria, 49 out of 109 mediation episodes (45 percent) in the sample resulted in a *settlement*, of which 23 and 18 were implemented at the 1-year (*effective settlement*) and 5-year thresholds (*durable settlement*), respectively.

3.2 Institutional data

Explanatory variables were drawn from a completely new dataset mapping the evolution of institutional design of peace-brokering IOs between 1945 and 2010 (Lundgren 2016). I defined peace-brokering IOs as (1) formal intergovernmental entities recognized by international law, having (2) at least three state members, and (3) incorporating functions concerned with the direct management of violent disputes, defined as formal mandates and specialized bureaucratic structures for mediation

and/or military deployments. The dataset covers all IOs listed by DICW and CWM as engaging in mediation since 1975.[8]

For each IO, this dataset contains yearly observations indicators of various dimensions of institutional design, including depth and scope of institutionalized capabilities. In compiling the data, I relied on several types of primary and secondary sources. The key measures of conflict management capabilities were scored based on the analysis of multilateral treaties, protocols, and administrative decisions, together with data sourced from IO reports and web pages, such as organigrams and budget records. The extent of documentation varied by organization, with some (e.g., ASEAN) scored on the basis of a handful of texts, whereas others (such as the UN or AU) were scored on the basis of several dozens of items. After the initial scanning of texts, relevant paragraphs were extracted for evaluation and comparison against scoring criteria (as described under the relevant variables below). For years in which there was no change in a given capability, I awarded a score identical to that of the previous year. To determine an IO's practical experience of interventions in a particular policy area, I relied on data on IO interventions gathered from Regan and Aydin (2009), DeRouen et al. (2011), Fortna (2008), Mays (2010) as well as from directories available on IO web pages.[9]

These data provide two key benefits. First, IO-specific observations allowed me to set aside assumptions of unit homogeneity. Second, the data capture longitudinal variation in the independent variables. With yearly observations, the data is highly time-sensitive, which allows for temporal matching; that is, if I want to evaluate a mediation episode that took place in 1978, I can extract data on institutional capacities of the relevant IO in that specific year, rather than rely on a temporally static, and therefore misleading, estimate. The importance of capturing not only cross-IO variation, but also temporal variation, is illustrated in Fig. 2, which displays the average institutionalization of the 13 IOs in the sample.[10]

3.3 Information

The first independent variable, *diplomatic capability*, captures the scope of an IO's institutionalized capability for diplomatic conflict management, including mediation,

[8]United Nations (UN), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Organization of American States (OAS), Organization of African Unity (OAU) / African Union (AU), Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), League of Arab States (LAS), Commonwealth of Nations (CON), European Union (EU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

[9]Further details on the content and compilation of these data may be found in the online appendix available on the Review of International Organizations webpage.

[10]The institutionalization scores in Fig. 2 are calculated as follows. First, for each year and IO, I aggregated the scores for the two principal institutional variables, diplomatic capability and field mission capability. Second, I averaged across all IOs in a given year. Third, I set 1975 as the base year with a value of 100, from which I calculated a yearly index score.



Fig. 2 Average institutionalization index score for 13 peace-brokering IOs, 1945-2010. A higher score represents greater diplomatic and field mission capabilities (1975=100). Data: Author's own

good offices, and conciliation mechanisms. The measurement follows a three-tiered scale, where *Minimal* represents the lowest level, *Structured* the middle level, and *Specialized* the highest level of diplomatic capabilities. The categorization of IOs into these three levels was based on the scores for two underlying parameters: 'institutional support,' a measure of the administrative and human resources an IO can muster to gather and process information (Savun 2008), and 'practice,' a measure of institutional experience and learning (Benner et al. 2011).

Adding up the scores for practice and institutional support yielded a range from 0 to 6. IOs with scores from 0 to 2 were classified as *Minimal*; IOs with scores from 3 to 4 as *Structured*; and those with scores above 5 as *Specialized*.

Institutional support was coded as follows: 1 if the IO has no mandate or if the mandate is supported only as a general function of a non-specialized secretariat; 2 if the diplomatic conflict resolution is supported by a minor (less than 50 staff) institutional body, such as a sub-office or minor department; 3 if diplomatic conflict resolution is supported by a major (more than 50 staff) institutional body, such as a department of significant size, a specialized agency, or similar. Practice was coded as follows: 1 if the IO lacks a mandate to engage in diplomatic forms of conflict management; 2 if an IO mandate for diplomatic conflict management exists (by treaty, declaration or protocol) and has been exercised at least once in the last 10 years; 3 if a mandate exists and has been exercised at least five times in the last 10 years, reflecting a greater experience, regularization of practices, and level of organizational learning.

Consider the UN as an illustration of this coding. At its inception, there was very little institutional support to engage in diplomatic interventions (score of 1). From the 1950s, as the tasks of the organization and its Secretary General expanded, a small cluster of officials and units emerged to provide support for mediation and other forms of conflict management (score of 2), but no major institutionalized support existed before the establishment of the Department of Political Affairs in 1992 (score of 3). As to 'practice,' this developed more rapidly at the UN, going from 1 in 1945 to 3 within a decade, as Dag Hammarskjöld pioneered the model of an activist Secretary General through a series of diplomatic engagements in in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa in the 1950s (Skjelsbaek 1991). With these scores, the UN reached a diplomatic capability at the *Structured* level very soon after its creation and, by reaching a total score of 5, at the *Specialized* level from 1953.

3.4 Guarantees

An IO's ability to provide guarantees in a peace negotiation is related to its capacity to, and experience of, managing military operations in civil war situations. As with the *diplomatic capability* variable, *field mission capability* is a three-tier categorical variable based on two underlying parameters, with higher scores indicating a greater depth of institutionalization and experience. The coding is identical to that of *diplomatic capability*, with the important difference that it captures institutional support with respect to field missions, primarily peacekeeping and monitoring operations.

To illustrate the coding, consider the case of the African Union (AU). For thirty years after its creation in 1963, the Organization of African Unity (later African Union), lacked any mandate or bureaucratic structures to engage in field missions (coded as 1). In 1993, the organization established a mechanism for conflict resolution, which included peacekeeping and collaboration with UN peace operations, together with some minimal bureaucratic structures (coded as 2). Then, in 2002, the African Union went through a serious upgrading of its mandate and institutional structure, establishing a Peace and Security Council and a range of subsidiary bureaucratic bodies (coded as 3). In the practice dimension, the organization is scored as 1 until 2003, when it dispatched a peacekeeping operation to the Burundian civil war, considered the first fully AU-led field mission, bringing its practice scores to 2 and its total field mission score to 5, where it remained through to the end of the observation series. With these scores, AU is categorized as having a field mission capability at the *Minimal* level between 1963 and 1992, at the *Structured* level between 1993 and 2002, and at the *Specialized* level since 2003.

3.5 Control variables

I included three clusters of variables to control for heterogeneity across IOs, conflicts, and countries. To control for variation in the political clout of IOs, I included the variable *membership power*, proxied by the logged combined Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score of the mediating IO's member states in the year of mediation, calculated from data on IO membership (Pevehouse et al. 2004) and

from COW data on national material capabilities (Singer et al. 1972).[11] The variable *timing*, measured as the time (in months) between civil war onset and the start of IO mediation, was sourced from DICW, representing a factor that prior research has indicated may play a role in determining mediation outcomes (Bercovitch 1996; Regan and Stam 2000; Zartman 2000). A dummy variable, *previous mediation*, indicates whether an IO is mediating in a conflict where it has made prior attempts, so as to control for conflict-specific learning effects. Since IOs occasionally take part in multiparty mediation efforts (Crocker et al. 1999) that may provide them with additional resources beyond their own, I also included the binary variable *state support*, scored as 1 in cases where IOs were the "lead" mediator but had states as junior partners in the mediation coalition. To account for different conflict characteristics, I included the variables *conflict intensity* and *incompatibility*. While some argue that high conflict intensity facilitates mediated settlements (Young 1967; Fearon 2004), many scholars hold that a conflict with a higher rate of fatalities is more difficult to resolve (Kleiboer 1996; Regan and Stam 2000). The variable was coded using UCDP-PRIO data on conflict intensity (Themnér and Wallensteen 2013), following the UCDP-PRIO protocol of giving a score of 0 to conflicts that do not reach the threshold of 25 battle deaths per calendar year, a score of 1 for those that fall between 25 and 1,000 battle deaths, and a score of 2 for those with more than 1,000 battle deaths. I also included the variable *incompatibility*, coded as 1 for conflicts about territory and 2 for conflicts over government control. To hold country characteristics constant (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Hegre and Sambanis 2006), I included a vector of standard variables, including the level of economic development (real GDP per capita), population, and regime type (Polity IV data) (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.

4 Results

Table 2 presents the results of the empirical analysis. All models use logistic regression. Models 1-3 evaluate the effect of information capabilites on each of the dependent variables and models 4-6 do the same for guarantee capabilities. Overall, the results indicate no support for hypothesis 1, but relatively consistent support for hypothesis 2.

The information variables used to represent hypothesis 1 are not significantly related to either of the outcome variables. The coefficient for *Structured diplomatic capability*, the variable representing the mid-tier level of institutionalization with respect to informational capabilities, aligns with expectation, but does not reach standard levels of statistical significance in any of the models. The coefficient for *Specialized diplomatic capability*, representing IOs with the highest level of informational capabilities, is positive in model 1 but negative in models 2 and 3, and at no instance statistically significant. In other words, we cannot reject the null: based

[11] Data expanded to 2007.

Table 1 Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.
Settlement	0.34	0.48
Effective settlement	0.20	0.40
Durable settlement	0.19	0.40
Minimal diplomatic cap	0.16	0.37
Structured diplomatic cap	0.49	0.50
Specialized diplomatic cap	0.35	0.48
Minimal field mission cap	0.24	0.43
Structured field mission cap	0.27	0.45
Specialized field mission cap	0.49	0.50
Timing (log)	3.73	1.64
Previous mediation	0.54	0.50
Membership power (log)	−1.51	1.66
Conflict intensity	1.20	0.69
Incompatibility	0.50	0.50
Economic development	2,670	3,675
Population	27.9 m	47.6 m
Regime type	−1.36	5.47
State support	0.16	0.37
IO democracy	0.29	3.83
Peacekeeping operation	0.17	0.37

on these analyses we cannot say that having greater institutional support and greater experience of mediation interventions translate into greater efficacy as a mediator. Rather, the results suggest that there is no relation between information capabilities, as captured here, and the outcome of IO mediation.

Regarding hypothesis 2, the results provide robust confirmation of the theoretical expectation. The coefficient for both measures of field mission capability are positive across all three outcomes (models 4-6). A higher institutionalization of field mission capability is thus associated with a higher predicted probability of mediation success, both in procedural and substantive terms. This corroborates the guarantee argument underlying hypothesis 2: being able to credibly offer the deployment of a well-administered peacekeeping force is a significant factor in convincing conflict parties to agree and, further, to stick to an agreement. Importantly, given that the unit of analysis is mediation attempts, these results suggest that the promise of military guarantees may have a "forward-looking" effect: in mediating situations, which by definition take place before a war is over, IOs with in-house field mission capabilities stand a greater chance of moving conflict parties towards an agreement, even before such field missions are deployed. These forward-looking strategic dynamics are explored further below (model 11).

Table 2 Logit estimates of mediation success

	Dependent variable:					
	Settlement	Effective settlement	Durable settlement	Settlement	Effective settlement	Durable settlement
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Information						
Structured dipl. cap.	0.238	0.451	0.189			
	(0.694)	(1.123)	(1.235)			
Specialized dipl. cap.	0.236	−0.641	−0.843			
	(0.988)	(1.610)	(1.782)			
Guarantees						
Structured field miss. cap.				1.256	2.661*	4.824**
				(0.813)	(1.465)	(2.420)
Specialized field miss. cap.				1.987*	4.019**	6.748**
				(1.148)	(1.979)	(3.133)
Controls - IO characteristics						
Membership power	0.190	0.109	0.147	−0.135	−0.686	−0.857
	(0.218)	(0.302)	(0.319)	(0.308)	(0.450)	(0.522)
Timing	−0.252	−0.467*	−0.507*	−0.176	−0.198	−0.076
	(0.179)	(0.283)	(0.299)	(0.193)	(0.328)	(0.351)
Previous mediation	0.665	1.043	0.921	0.778	1.230	0.812
	(0.545)	(0.918)	(0.948)	(0.548)	(1.015)	(1.047)
State support	0.146	0.189	−0.472	0.288	0.412	−0.886
	(0.680)	(0.982)	(1.174)	(0.717)	(1.098)	(1.477)
Controls - conflict characteristics						
Conflict intensity	−0.438	−1.257**	−1.400**	−0.341	−0.885*	−1.049*
	(0.348)	(0.520)	(0.550)	(0.353)	(0.521)	(0.564)
Incompatibility	0.292	0.769	1.115	−0.087	−0.526	−0.646
	(0.593)	(0.963)	(1.057)	(0.616)	(1.047)	(1.187)
Controls - country characteristics						
Regime type	0.061	0.112	0.075	0.073	0.186**	0.115
	(0.049)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.051)	(0.087)	(0.092)

Table 2 (continued)

	Dependent variable:					
	Settlement	Effective settlement	Durable settlement	Settlement	Effective settlement	Durable settlement
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Population	−0.000	0.000	0.000	−0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Economic development	−0.0001	−0.0001	−0.0001	−0.0001	−0.0002*	−0.0003*
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Period fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.712	−0.538	0.261	−0.849	−4.75*	−6.18*
	(1.34)	(2.19)	(2.26)	(1.53)	(2.76)	(3.69)
Observations	109	109	109	109	109	109
Log Likelihood	−63.1	−34.4	−32.2	−61.3	−31.9	−27.5
AIC	158.3	100.8	96.4	154.5	95.8	87.1

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Of the control variables, *timing* and *previous mediation* behave as expected, with negative and positive coefficients, respectively. Intervening to mediate at an earlier stage may be beneficial, as might the experience and understanding that comes from having engaged in the conflict previously. The results for *conflict intensity* are among the strongest, in substantive terms, pointing to a considerable and negative association between severity of violence and mediation effectiveness. Coefficients for *Regime type* suggest that democratic countries may be more receptive to mediation. No period fixed effects have a statistically significant coefficient.

Since numerical logit coefficients are somewhat opaque, substantively, I calculated predicted probabilities and average partial effects. I used the R plugin *Zelig* (Imai et al. 2008, 2009) to simulate expected outcome values for the three different values of field mission capabilities. Figure 3 illustrates how the expected mediation success varies as a function of field mission capability and conflict intensity, holding all other variables constant at their means or at substantively meaningful and representative values (no previous mediation, no state support, contests over government; based on model 5). For example, moving from the Minimal to the Specialized category is associated with a 30 percentage point increase in the expected probability of



Fig. 3 Impact of field mission capability on probability of effective settlement at different values of conflict intensity. Calculations based on model 5

mediation success, if conflict intensity is high (score of 2), or about 50 percentage points if conflict intensity is low (score of 0).

Average partial effects of field mission capabilities on durable settlement are shown in Fig. 4. The average partial effect is the amount that the probability of a durable settlement increases when field mission capabilities increase from the Minimal level (the reference category) to the Structured or Specialized levels, averaging across all the observations in the data. While the amount of uncertainty is high, as indicated by the confidence intervals, both of the higher levels of field mission capabilities yield clear benefits compared with the reference category. This evidence confirms the existence of variation in effectiveness across levels of field mission capability. Some IOs have enough field mission capabilities to move combatants to a durable settlement, whereas others (in this case, the minimal IOs) do not, even if they try. Note that the average partial effect (point value) is higher for the Structured level than for the Specialized level, suggesting that IOs with a higher capability are actually a little less effective, on average, than IOs with a somewhat lower capability. The difference between the results here and those received when calculating predicted probabilities is that the latter is based on actual observed data for non-IV covariates. The difference suggests the possibility of additional contextual factors, beyond those already controlled for, that function to handicap the interventions of the most institutionalized IOs. For example, it may be that the UN, one of the IOs that fall into the Specialized capability category for most of the observed data, is called upon to mediate in particularly challenging cases.



Fig. 4 Average partial effect of field mission capability on durable settlement (compared with the "Minimal" reference category)

4.1 Selection effects and robustness

Before discussing the wider implications of the results, I want to assure their robustness by addressing the possibility of selection effects, a complication common to evaluative studies (cf. Angrist and Pischke 2008). Is the demonstrated correlation between institutional features and successful outcomes an effect of better capabilities, or is it explained by heterogeneity across the conflicts that receive mediation by IOs with varying levels of institutionalization? More concretely: does the correlation indicate that capacities have a positive effect, or that highly institutionalized IO mediators are good at selecting the most promising cases? Or, alternatively, is it the case that highly institutionalized IOs tend to get the job of mediating the most troublesome conflicts? Both of these "stories" are empirically plausible.

I tested for selection effects by estimating a two-step Heckman correction model (Heckman 1979). This corrects for possible selection biases by simultaneously estimating models for mediation selection ("IO Mediation") and settlement ("Settlement"). The first step estimates an equation for which conflict years are more or less likely to be selected for mediation by IOs, from a population of 1,170 civil war years between 1975 and 2004. The second step estimates an equation for the probability of settlement, with the same coefficients as before. The exclusion restriction is built on the assumptions that there are temporal variations in institutional capabilities (as is suggested by Fig. 2), that there are no strong temporal trends in mediation outcomes (which is suggested by the period fixed effects), and that other predictors do

not covary strongly with time. It is not a fully convincing instrument, which suggests that we must interpret these results with caution.

Looking at the first step ("IO Mediation") in Table 3, the coefficient for *Year* is positive and significant, indicating that IOs are more likely to mediate civil wars that fall later in the observed period, as we would expect, given the increased activity of IOs referred to in the introduction. The most important result from the above, the positive effect from field mission capabilities, remains robust to selection effects. Even when taking the slight selection bias into account, IOs with greater field mission capabilities are more likely to bring about negotiated settlements that are implemented and endure (models 10 through 12).

However, there is still a risk that, depending on their institutional capacities, some IOs tend to mediate a particular type of conflict. To control for this, I regressed conflict characteristics (*incompatibility* and *conflict intensity*) against the institutional variables. As can be seen in Table 4 (models 13 and 14), none of the key institutional variables were significantly associated with conflict characteristics, except diplomatic capabilities at the structured level (model 14). A positive association between diplomatic capabilities and incompatibility suggests a tendency of such IOs to mediate in conflicts over government. As we saw in Table 2, however, there is no consistent effect for *incompability* on mediation outcomes, so the selection effects arising from IOs with diplomatic capabilities at the Structured level are unlikely to significantly distort the results. More importantly, the results indicate that field mission capabilities do not correlate with the two key types of conflict characteristics. It is therefore less likely that selection effects are the key driver of the positive results seen above.

To further ascertain the robustness of the results, I tested for a number of alternative specifications, some of which are reported in Table 5.[12] First, based on previous literature (Boehmer et al. 2004), it may be expected that some of the variation in IO effects stem from variation in the nature of the IO memberships. Model 16 includes a variable for *IO democracy*, measured as the average level of democracy of an IO's member states, calculated from Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). The key results are robust to including this variable. Second, I estimated a model (17) with a dependent variable, *war termination*, disregarding procedural outcomes and focusing solely on whether or not an intervention was followed by war termination. The relevant coefficients suggest that IOs with higher levels of field mission capabilities are much more likely to bring about war termination than IOs in the reference category.

In addition, I estimated a number of alternative models (reported in the online appendix), including parameterization of the two key institutional variables as an ordinal variable rather than categorical dummies. The above results are robust to these alternative specifications. The principal results are also robust to the inclusion of additional controls for country characteristics (e.g., ethno-linguistic fractionalization), spatial lags (conflict in neighboring states), and further capacity variables, such

[12] Full robustness checks can be found in the online appendix available on the Review of International Organizations' webpage.

Table 3 Heckman selection models

	Dependent variable:					
	Settlement	Effective settlement	Durable settlement	Settlement	Effective settlement	Durable settlement
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Selection						
Conflict intensity	−0.101	−0.101	−0.101	−0.101	−0.101	−0.101
	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.106)
Incompatibility	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)
Year	0.025***	0.025***	0.025***	0.025***	0.025***	0.025***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Outcome						
Structured dipl. cap.	0.041	0.057	0.032			
	(0.134)	(0.094)	(0.091)			
Specialized dipl. cap.	0.019	−0.081	−0.092			
	(0.204)	(0.143)	(0.138)			
Structured field miss. cap.				0.226	0.251**	0.281***
				(0.146)	(0.101)	(0.097)
Specialized field miss. cap.				0.386*	0.338**	0.379***
				(0.219)	(0.154)	(0.145)
Controls - IO characteristics						
Membership power	0.044	0.006	0.009	−0.033	−0.078*	−0.080**
	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.061)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Timing	−0.053	−0.045*	−0.046*	−0.033	−0.020	−0.018
	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.024)
Previous mediation	0.114	0.078	0.062	0.133	0.100	0.082
	(0.104)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.100)	(0.070)	(0.066)
State support	0.025	−0.019	−0.065	0.039	−0.009	−0.051
	(0.132)	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.129)	(0.091)	(0.086)

Table 3 (continued)

	Dependent variable:					
	Settlement	Effective settlement	Durable settlement	Settlement	Effective settlement	Durable settlement
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Controls - conflict characteristics						
Conflict intensity	−0.044	−0.154*	−0.137*	−0.052	−0.174*	−0.157*
	(0.130)	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.114)	(0.095)	(0.080)
Incompatibility	−0.026	0.052	0.043	−0.051	0.051	0.033
	(0.202)	(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.190)	(0.143)	(0.129)
Controls - country characteristics						
Regime type	0.010	0.010	0.007	0.014	0.015**	0.011*
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Population	−0.000	0.000	0.000	−0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Economic development	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000*	−0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	2.254	0.424	1.139	0.906	−1.400	−0.822
	(2.712)	(1.910)	(1.841)	(2.634)	(1.816)	(1.739)
Observations	1,170	1,170	1,170	1,170	1,170	1,170
R^2	0.127	0.351	0.369	0.155	0.383	0.417
ρ	−0.932	−0.109	−0.810	−0.570	0.986	0.856

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

as IO field offices. I also estimated a series of models using separate measures for institutional support and practice. These suggest that diplomatic experience may provide some benefit in bringing parties to a settlement, but that institutional support for field missions remain the key factor for creating settlements that last.

4.2 Exploring forward-looking guarantees

The strongest result to emerge from the analyses is the impact of field mission capabilities. Measures of this aspect of institutional design have been robust across a range

Table 4 Robustness estimates

	Dependent variable:				
	Conflict intensity	Incompatibility	Effective settlement		War termination
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
Information					
Structured dipl. cap.	−0.175	0.290**	−1.047	−1.080	
	(0.207)	(0.142)	(1.309)	(1.312)	
Specialized dipl. cap.	−0.129	0.143	−2.718	−2.819	
	(0.339)	(0.238)	(1.885)	(1.884)	
Guarantees					
Structured field miss. cap.	0.043	0.039	2.676	2.999*	7.430***
	(0.196)	(0.136)	(1.635)	(1.792)	(2.350)
Specialized field miss. cap.	−0.063	0.072	5.609**	5.367**	7.943***
	(0.260)	(0.184)	(2.443)	(2.483)	(2.794)
Controls - IO characteristics					
Membership power			−0.749	−0.556	−1.223**
			(0.492)	(0.625)	(0.580)
Timing			−0.257	−0.267	0.718**
			(0.332)	(0.336)	(0.308)
Previous mediation			1.447	1.431	0.304
			(1.076)	(1.082)	(0.797)
State support			0.576	0.514	−2.558*
			(1.144)	(1.150)	(1.367)
IO democracy				−0.076	
				(0.159)	
Controls - conflict characteristics					
Conflict intensity			−1.000*	−1.019*	−1.710***
			(0.553)	(0.562)	(0.586)
Incompatibility			−0.579	−0.596	−0.502
			(1.129)	(1.136)	(0.985)

Table 4 (continued)

	Dependent variable:				
	Conflict intensity	Incompatibility	Effective settlement		War termination
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
Controls - country characteristics					
Regime type			0.169**	0.161*	0.056
			(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.076)
Population			0.00001	0.00000	−0.00001
			(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
Economic development			−0.0002	−0.0002	−0.0003***
			(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Constant	1.506***	0.164	−4.268	−3.083	−8.239**
	(0.241)	(0.166)	(2.822)	(3.767)	(3.272)
Observations	109	109	109	109	109
R^2	0.043	0.134			
AIC	254.1	163.7	97.6	99.4	96.1

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

of specifications and for different outcome variables, suggesting that it helps enhance bargaining between disputants both in the negotiation phase and in the implementation phase. There are two key implications. First, there is a temporal dynamic. The analysis strongly suggests that conflict actors receiving IO mediation assess the enforceability of a peace deal "down the road" and that their willingness to enter into an agreement will factor in the likelihood of future IO deployments. Second, there is a resource dynamic. The data are consistent with the notion that disputants assess the credibility of guarantees – and by extension, the credibility of an agreement – by evaluating the resources and experience of the mediating IO. If it has a strong field mission capability, it is more likely to be seen as a credible guarantor, making the disputants more prone to sign an agreement, and more likely to stick to it in the post-conflict phase.

An empirical implication of the above analysis is that civil war settlements mediated by IOs should be more likely to survive if field missions are not only promised, but actually provided. To assess this implication, I analyzed a subset of the data, consisting of those 49 cases where IO interventions were followed by negotiated settlements. I ran a new logistic regression, adding covariates for the two key institutional capabilities, as well as a new variable, *peacekeeping operation*, taking the value of 1 if there was an IO peacekeeping operation deployed to the conflict

Table 5 The effect of post-mediation IO deployments on durable settlement

	(1) Durable settlement
Structured diplomatic capability	1.08
	(0.84)
Specialized diplomatic capability	−0.23
	(1.08)
Structured field mission capability	1.10
	(0.87)
Specialized field mission capability	0.46
	(1.07)
Peacekeeping operation	1.09**
	(0.44)
Incompatibility	0.44
	(0.89)
(Intercept)	−1.91
	(0.77)
N	49
AIC	78.5

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

country in the same year as the settlement. I coded this variable based on data on peacekeeping operations (Fortna 2008) and directories available via the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.[13] The difference between *field mission capability* and *peacekeeping operation* is that the former measures an IO's latent capacity, and how this may be leveraged in a mediation situation, whereas the latter measures the impact of a military contingent that is operationally deployed at the time of measurement. In other words, this is a direct measure of security guarantees following IO mediation. As can be seen in Table 5, the effect of IO guarantees is clear. Of the 49 agreements mediated by IOs, those with IO peacekeepers were much more likely to survive. Of the 23 agreements that were implemented after 1 year, peacekeeping operations were present in 7 cases (30 percent); in the 26 agreements that fell apart, peacekeeping operations were present in only four cases (13 percent). Hence, the evidence investigated here is consistent with theoretical expectations at several stages in the cycle from mediation initiation, extension of guarantee capabilities, to the actual deployment of field missions.

5 Conclusion

In this article, I have used original data to perform a statistical evaluation of the repertoire of means available to IOs engaging in civil war mediation, showing that

[13] http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml

variation in institutional design can partially explain variation in outcomes. IOs with institutionalized bureaucratic structures to support the planning and deployment of field missions outperform other IOs as mediators of civil wars, whereas structures geared toward information-gathering do not yield a significant advantage. Irrespective of institutional capabilities, the effectiveness of IOs is greatly reduced in conditions of severe conflict and when mediation takes place late in a conflict's life span.

These analyses confirm the value of linking the literature on IO institutional design to the study of civil war and conflict resolution, generally, and to that of IO mediation, specifically. They make it clear that the large-N literature on mediation, in which IOs are conventionally regarded as uniform (e.g., Crescenzi et al. 2011; Gartner 2011; Lundgren and Svensson 2014), stands to benefit from taking institutional variation more seriously into consideration: IOs are not all alike and their effects are not uniform. Thereby, this study aligns with the general thrust of those prior studies of IO mediation that recognize the importance of institutional design (Boehmer et al. 2004; Hansen et al. 2008; Haftel 2007, 2012), but it also extends beyond them, by developing measures for assessing what specific features of institutional design matter for conflict resolution. The earlier studies, relying on relatively rudimentary measures of institutional design have not been able to distinguish the particular effects of different types of design components, which is a requisite for capturing the linkages between institutional features and information and commitment dynamics. Furthermore, while Boehmer et al. (2004) and Hansen et al. (2008) find that the most institutionalized IOs are the most effective, a result that corresponds well with the finding here, I show that there is considerable variation even among the highly institutionalized IOs, both across time and design features.

My analysis corroborates the importance of post-settlement security guarantees (Walter 2002; Collier et al. 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Sisk 2009), identifying features of IO design that predict the effectiveness of such guarantees when used in connection with IO civil war mediation. The results have highlighted a resource dynamic: robust field mission capabilities are a crucial resource for effective IO mediation, across all definitions of effectiveness. There is also a temporal, strategic dynamic, since the analysis suggests that the field mission capabilities of an IO mediator may have an influence on the direction of negotiations long before field missions are actually deployed. This "forward-looking" nature of guarantees has previously been identified, most clearly by Walter (2002), but it has not been explored explicitly from an IO design perspective. My results suggest that such guarantees are not uniformly effective, but that they vary with the institutional characteristics of the mediator.

The study found no evidence that we could use variation in information gathering capacity to explain variation in mediation effectiveness, an argument presented by Elgström et al. (2003) and Savun (2009). There are several plausible interpretations of these results. First, even if the measures employed here are more fine-grained than what has been previously used in the literature, it is possible that they fail to capture the underlying theoretical dynamics. Second, it is possible that mediators rely less on information sourced via institutional structures than on information provided directly by conflict parties in face-to-face interactions. Having an institutionalized

diplomatic capacity may matter less in making sense of such direct information than the quality of individual mediators. Third, it is possible that informational factors are a better explanation for conflict initiation than for conflict termination, and that lengthier conflicts tend to be driven by commitment problems rather than by information asymmetries, a proposition that has been discussed in the literature (Fearon 2004; Hegre 2004; Walter 2009). Since the results of this study are congruent with several alternative views, they encourage us to look at the information-provision logic through a more fine-grained lens, with particular attention to how information travels in mediation interactions.

As has been highlighted elsewhere (Beardsley 2011), it is possible that external interventions create short-term, artificial incentives that temporarily shift disputant strategies, but fail to produce long-term change. I have sought to correct for this by including measures of longer-term outcomes, up to five years after a mediation intervention, but it is possible that the impact of IO interventions needs to be studied from the perspective of even longer time spans. As better data on civil wars and IO interventions become available, more sophisticated longitudinal studies should be pursued.

References

Anderton, C.H., Carter, J.R., Braddon, D., & Hartley, K. (2010). A bargaining theory perspective on war. Handbook on the Economics of Conflict.

Angrist, J.D., Imbens, G.W., & Rubin, D.B. (1996). Identification of causal effects using instrumental variables. *Journal of the American statistical Association*, *91*(434), 444–455.

Angrist, J.D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2008). *Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist's companion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Beardsley, K. (2011). *The mediation dilemma*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Benner, T., Mergenthaler, S., & Rotmann, P. (2011). *The New World of UN Peace Operations: Learning to Build Peace?*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bercovitch, J. (1996). *Resolving international conflicts: The theory and practice of mediation*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Bercovitch, J. (1997). Mediation in international conflict, In Zartman, W. (Ed.) *Peacemaking in international conflict: Methods and techniques, pp.125–153. United States Inst of Peace Press*.

Bercovitch, J., & Diehl, P. (1997). Conflict management of enduring rivalries: The frequency, timing, and short-term impact of mediation. *International Interactions*, *22*(4), 299–320.

Blainey, G. (1988). The causes of war. Free Pr.

Blattman, C., & Miguel, E. (2010). Civil war. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 3–57.

Boehmer, C., Gartzke, E., & Nordstrom, T. (2004). Do intergovernmental organizations promote peace? *World Politics*, *57*(01), 1–38.

Cederman, L.-E., Gleditsch, K.S., & Buhaug, H. (2013). *Inequality, Grievances, and Civil war*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Checkel, J.T. (2013). *Transnational dynamics of civil war*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2002). On the incidence of civil war in Africa. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *46*(1), 13–28.

Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Söderbom, M. (2008). Post-conflict risks. *Journal of Peace Research*, *45*(4), 461–478.

Crescenzi, M., Kadera, K., McLaughlin Mitchell, S., & Thyne, C. (2011). A supply side theory of mediation. *International Studies Quarterly*, *55*(4), 1069–94.

Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F.O., & Aall, P.R. (1999). Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press.

DeRouen, K., Bercovitch, J., & Pospieszna, P. (2011). Introducing the civil wars mediation (CWM) dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, *48*(5), 663–672.

Dixon, W.J. (1996). Third-party techniques for preventing conflict escalation and promoting peaceful settlement. *International Organization*, *50*(04), 653–681.
Doyle, M., & Sambanis, N. (2006). *Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Elgström, O., Bercovitch, J., & Skau, C. (2003). Regional organisations and international mediation: The effectiveness of insider mediators. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, *3*(1), 11–27.
Ero, C. (1995). ECOWAS And subregional peacekeeping in Liberia. *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, *25*, 1–12.
Fearon, J. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. *International Organization*, *49*, 379–379.
Fearon, J. (2004). Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others? *Journal of Peace Research*, *41*(3), 275–301.
Fearon, J., & Laitin, D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American Political Science Review*, *97*(01), 75–90.
Fortna, V. (2008). *Does peacekeeping work? Shaping belligerents' choices after civil war*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. *Journal of peace research*, *6*(3), 167–191.
Gartner, S. (2011). Signs of trouble: Regional organization mediation and civil war agreement durability. *Journal of Politics*, *73*(2), 380–390.
Gilady, L., & Russett, B. (2002). Peacemaking and conflict resolution, In Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T., Simmons, B., Gilady, L., & Russett, B. (Eds.) (pp. 392–408): Sage Publications Ltd.
Gleditsch, N.P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M., & Strand, H. (2002). Armed conflict 1946-2001: A new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, *39*(5), 615–637.
Greig, J., & Diehl, P. (2012). International Mediation. Polity.
Hafner-Burton, E.M., Von Stein, J., & Gartzke, E. (2008). International organizations count. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *52*(2), 175–188.
Haftel, Y. (2007). Designing for peace: Regional integration arrangements, institutional variation, and militarized interstate disputes. *International Organization*, *61*(01), 217–237.
Haftel, Y. (2012). *Regional economic institutions and conflict mitigation: Design, implementation, and the promise of peace*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
Hansen, H., McLaughlin Mitchell, S., & Nemeth, S. (2008). IO Mediation of interstate conflicts. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *52*(2), 295–325.
Hartzell, C., & Hoddie, M. (2007). *Crafting peace: Power-sharing institutions and the negotiated settlement of civil wars*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Heckman, J.J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 153–161.
Hegre, H. (2004). The duration and termination of civil war. *Journal of Peace Research*, *41*(3), 243–252.
Hegre, H., & Sambanis, N. (2006). Sensitivity analysis of empirical results on civil war onset. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *50*(4), 508–535.
Hoddie, M., & Hartzell, C. (2005). Power sharing in peace settlements: Initiating the transition from civil war, In Roeder, P., & Rothchild, D. (Eds.) *Sustainable peace: power and democracy after civil wars* (pp. 83–106): Cornell University Press.
Iji, T. (2005). Cooperation, coordination and complementarity in international peacemaking: The Tajikistan experience. *International Peacekeeping*, *12*(2), 189–204.
Imai, K., King, G., & Lau, O. (2008). Toward a common framework for statistical analysis and development. *Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics*, *17*(4), 892–913.
Imai, K., King, G., & Lau, O. (2009). Zelig: Everyone's statistical software. R Package Version 3(5).
Kalyvas, S.N., & Balcells, L. (2010). International system and technologies of rebellion: How the end of the cold war shaped internal conflict. *American Political Science Review*, *104*(03), 415–429.
Kleiboer, M. (1996). Understanding success and failure of international mediation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *40*(2), 360–389.
Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., & Kydd, A. (2001). The rational design of international institutions. *International Organization*, *55*(4), 761–799.
Kydd, A. (2003). Which side are you on? Bias, credibility, and mediation. *American Journal of Political Science*, *47*(4), 597–611.

Kydd, A. (2010). Rationalist approaches to conflict prevention and resolution. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *13*, 101–121.
Lindley, D. (2007). *Promoting peace with information: Transparency as a tool of security regimes*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lundgren, M. (2016). Conflict management capabilities of peace-brokering international organizations, 1945–2010: A new dataset. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *33*(2), 198–223.
Lundgren, M., & Svensson, I. (2014). Leanings and dealings: Exploring bias and trade leverage in civil war mediation by international organizations. *International Negotiation*, *19*(2), 315–342.
Marshall, M.G., & Jaggers, K. (2002). Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2002.
Mattes, M., & Savun, B. (2009). Fostering peace after civil war: commitment problems and agreement design. *International Studies Quarterly*, *53*(3), 737–759.
Pevehouse, J., Nordstrom, T., & Warnke, K. (2004). The Correlates of War 2 international governmental organizations data version 2.0. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *21*(2), 101–119.
Powell, R. (1996). Bargaining in the shadow of power. *Games and Economic Behavior*, *15*, 255–289.
Powell, R. (2002). Bargaining theory and international conflict. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *5*(1), 1–30.
Powell, R. (2006). War as a commitment problem. *International Organization*, *60*(1), 169.
Princen, T. (1992). *Intermediaries in international conflict*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rauchhaus, R. (2006). Asymmetric information, mediation, and conflict management. *World Politics*, *58*(02), 207–241.
Regan, P., Frank, R., & Aydin, A. (2009). Diplomatic interventions and civil war: A new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, *46*(1), 135–146.
Regan, P., & Stam, A. (2000). In the nick of time: Conflict management, mediation timing, and the duration of interstate disputes. *International Studies Quarterly*, *44*(2), 239–260.
Richmond, O. (1998). Devious objectives and the disputants' view of international mediation: A theoretical framework. *Journal of Peace Research*, *35*(6), 707–722.
Savun, B. (2008). Information, bias, and mediation success. *International Studies Quarterly*, *52*(1), 25–47.
Savun, B. (2009). Mediator types and the effectiveness of information-provision strategies in the resolution of international conflict, In Bercovitch, J., & Gartner, S. (Eds.) *International conflict mediation: new approaches and findings* (pp. 96–114). New York: Routledge.
Singer, J., Bremer, S., & Stuckey, J. (1972). Capability distribution, uncertainty, and major power war, In Russett, B. (Ed.) *Peace, War, and Numbers* (pp. 19–48). Beverly Hills: Sage.
Sisk, T. (2009). International mediation in civil wars: bargaining with bullets. Taylor & Francis.
Skjelsbaek, K. (1991). The UN Secretary-General and the mediation of international disputes. *Journal of Peace Research*, *28*(1), 99–115.
Svensson, I. (2007). Bargaining, bias and peace brokers: How rebels commit to peace. *Journal of Peace Research*, *44*(2), 177–194.
Themnér, L., & Wallensteen, P. (2013). Armed conflicts, 1946–2012. *Journal of Peace Research*, *50*(4), 509–521.
Thruelsen, P. (2009). International Organisations: Their Role in Conflict Management. Royal Danish Defence College.
Wagner, R. (2007). *War and the State: The Theory of International Politics*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
Wallensteen, P., & Svensson, I. (2014). Talking peace: International mediaton in armed conflicts. *Journal of Peace Research*, *50*(2).
Walter, B. (1997). The critical barrier to civil war settlement. *International Organization*, *51*(3), 335–364.
Walter, B. (2002). *Committing to peace: The successful settlement of civil wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Walter, B. (2009). Bargaining failures and civil war. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *12*, 243–261.
Young, O. (1967). *The intermediaries: Third parties in international crises*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Zartman, I. (2000). Ripeness: The hurting stalemate and beyond, In Druckman, D. (Ed.) *International conflict resolution after the Cold War* (pp. 225–250). Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.